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Triple–bottom-line outcomes from resource management and con-
servation, where conservation goals and equity in social outcomes
are maximized while overall costs are minimized, remain a highly
sought-after ideal. However, despite widespread recognition of
the importance that equitable distribution of beneﬁts or costs
across society can play in conservation success, little formal theory
exists for how to explicitly incorporate equity into conservation
planning and prioritization. Here, we develop that theory and
implement it for three very different case studies in California
(United States), Raja Ampat (Indonesia), and the wider Coral Tri-
angle region (Southeast Asia). We show that equity tends to trade
off nonlinearly with the potential to achieve conservation objec-
tives, such that similar conservation outcomes can be possible with
greater equity, to a point. However, these case studies also pro-
duce a range of trade-off typologies between equity and conser-
vation, depending on how one deﬁnes and measures social equity,
including direct (linear) and no trade-off. Important gaps remain in
our understanding,most notably howequity inﬂuences probability
of conservation success, in turn affecting the actual ability to
achieve conservation objectives. Results here provide an important
foundation for moving the science and practice of conservation
planning—and broader spatial planning in general—toward more
consistently achieving efﬁcient, equitable, and effective outcomes.
marine protected areas | environmental justice | marine spatial planning |
ecosystem-based management | social-ecological systems
Conservation and resource management require decisionsabout where, when, and how to allocate limited ﬁnancial,
human, social, and/or political capital resources (1). Whether
designing protected areas, prioritizing restoration activities and
locations, or limiting, promoting, or allocating certain uses of the
landscape or seascape, the spatial and temporal distribution of
management actions requires decisions about who may beneﬁt
and who may pay costs (2, 3). A large body of literature on
conservation and spatial planning has been developed to help
guide management strategies and decisions to be as efﬁcient as
possible at meeting stated goals (e.g., refs. 4–7). However, the
goal of equitable distribution of costs or beneﬁts across indi-
viduals or communities from use restrictions is rarely explicitly
assessed in the planning process (8).
A fundamental tenet of conservation planning is that identi-
fying optimal allocations of actions in space and time requires
formulating the problem with explicit objective(s), constraints,
potential actions, and system models that translate those actions
into outcomes (1, 9). Objectives can take different forms, but the
ultimate aim is to ﬁnd the feasible set of actions that maximizes
the value of those objectives (e.g., maximum gain in value, mini-
mum area needed to achieve the objective). In most biodiversity
conservation optimization problems, objectives are biological and
framed as quantities, such as species viability or habitat repre-
sentation, that are usually traded off against, or constrained by,
economic outcomes. In the context of spatial planning and eco-
system-based management, objectives focus on particular serv-
ices, but otherwise the problem formulation remains the same.
In either case, economic outcomes are typically total cost (e.g.,
dollars spent) or opportunity cost (i.e., the monetary gains
expected in the absence of conservation actions). Trade-offs can
place in conﬂict those who prioritize economic versus biodiversity
(or service) value (10); but in other cases, biodiversity conserva-
tion and economic value positively covary (e.g., ref. 6), such that
strategic planning can deliver win–win solutions.
In many planning processes, there is awareness of social equity
issues, where equity may be a function of, for example, equality
of engagement in the planning process or reallocation of beneﬁts
or costs accrued under a management decision. In fact, achieving
equity along with economic and environmental beneﬁts—the
“triple bottom line”—is commonly seen as the ideal outcome of
conservation (11). However, rarely is equity incorporated into
decision making in a formal way. Formalizing equity as a quan-
tiﬁable and high-priority goal for conservation planning is fea-
sible, as we discuss and demonstrate below. However, explicitly
including this additional objective could compromise biodiversity
conservation, or in other words create another potential trade-
off among planning objectives (12).
Equity relates to how a person or group perceives the pro-
portional availability of goods and services (e.g., is a given pool
of resources evenly distributed and/or available?) or the relative
deprivation compared with others (e.g., do others have more
than I do?) (13). Despite the stated importance of equity in
management and decision-making processes (e.g., ref. 14), there
is no formal theory for addressing it in the conservation or spatial
planning literature. Furthermore, perceived or real inequity can
turn interested and cooperative participants into vocal oppo-
nents (15), leading to noncompliance or destructive actions (16,
17). Thus, equity can be a critical component of management and
conservation success. Here, we explore the nature of potential
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trade-offs between equity and conservation objectives, test this
theory in three case studies from around the world, and outline
potential modiﬁcations to the theory that future empirical work
could explore. Although our focus is on conservation planning,
results are equally relevant to broader questions addressed within
spatial planning contexts. Our work suggests that triple–bottom-
line solutions to conservation are possible, but that such solutions
depend on the form of equity being pursued. Importantly, in-
cluding equity as an explicit planning objective leads to clearer
delineation of trade-offs among multiple objectives.
Equity and Its Trade-Offs
Equity can manifest itself in a number of ways, with important
implications for how it gets incorporated into conservation
planning and the potential impacts it has on achieving conser-
vation targets. There are two key dimensions to measuring eq-
uity: (i) what is measured, which can include monetary loss or
gain, access to resources gained or lost, and level of participation
in a process (18), and (ii) how it is measured, either in absolute
or relative terms. The former deﬁnes the metric(s) used to assess
equity; the latter determines how groups are compared with
each other. The metrics used essentially link to three classes of
problems in conservation prioritization: economic beneﬁts such
as money or rights to use resources are being distributed among
a suite of political entities (e.g., countries, states, regions, non-
government organizations, or local governments) (19); conser-
vation actions, such as reserves or restrictions on uses, are being
put in place that are believed to impact or beneﬁt a variety of
communities or industries (20); and voice or opportunity is given
to different groups in a deliberate process (e.g., stakeholder in-
volvement or gender equity) (e.g., refs. 21, 22). Here, we em-
pirically explore the ﬁrst two problem types, but acknowledge
that participatory equity may be more important for achieving
desired outcomes than the other types of equity in some cases.
Once the type of equity to be measured is deﬁned, the target
objective for equity can be set in a number of ways. To date, most
policy has focused on avoiding extreme cases of inequity, in
particular those producing unethical conditions, within a frame-
work of environmental justice (e.g., refs. 23, 24). More recently,
attention has also focused on optimizing social equity through
instances where all stakeholders are included in the planning
process (18) or are affected equally by actions (12, 25, 26), and to
a lesser extent through consideration of intergenerational equity
(27, 28). It is typically assumed that increased equity comes at the
cost of ﬁnancially optimal conservation solutions, but the nature
and shape of that trade-off is generally unknown (29). In theory,
the trade-off could take any potential shape (Fig. S1), as is seen
with trade-offs among ecosystem services (10, 30). Through three
case study assessments, we evaluate the shape of these trade-off
curves and explore the implications of such trade-offs for
achieving conservation objectives.
Case Studies
Our three case studies include the following: (i) the central coast
of California (United States), where a network of marine pro-
tected areas (MPAs) was recently created with consideration of
impacts on local ﬁsheries, (ii) an MPA in the southern Raja
Ampat region of Indonesia where proposed no-take zones may
differentially impact villages’ ﬁshing access; and (iii) the Coral
Triangle region where international aid money is being distrib-
uted among six countries to mitigate threats to their marine
resources. As such, these cases evaluate two different metrics of
equity—dollars and access—and for the Coral Triangle example
in particular we explore implications of considering absolute
versus relative (i.e., proportional) changes in equity.
California Marine Protected Areas. California recently completed
an extensive, 8-y planning process to design and implement
a network of MPAs in its state waters, initiated by the Marine
Life Protection Act (MLPA) (31). Synthesis of existing in-
formation and development of new analytical frameworks pro-
vided a vast array of information on the potential trade-offs
between conservation and ﬁsheries values under different MPA
network designs (32, 33). We focus here on the central California
region within the MLPA process (Fig. S2A), because data for the
area are published and available (26). Previous analyses for this
region focused on the trade-off between how well conservation
objectives were met within a given MPA network and the po-
tential total costs to ﬁsheries (7). Here, we focus on imple-
menting marine reserves only (the MLPA process included less
restrictive MPAs as well) and deﬁne equity as cost in dollars to
eight separate commercial ﬁsheries, and measure equity using
the Gini coefﬁcient [deﬁned as the dissimilarity in costs or
beneﬁts among different entities (Materials and Methods)]. We
explore how different overall budget constraints on the com-
bined value lost by ﬁsheries interact with equity to inﬂuence the
nature of the trade-off between conservation goals and equitable
ﬁsheries impact.
Given budgets set to 3–20% of total ﬁsheries value, equity
traded off nonlinearly (concavely) with the degree to which
conservation goals could be achieved for all budgets (Fig. 1A).
Greater levels of both equity and conservation goals could be
achieved with higher total budgets (Fig. 1A). The points in Fig. 1
approximate the “efﬁciency frontier” where optimal solutions lie,
and represent different importance (weight) given to conserva-
tion versus equity goals under each budget scenario. The absence
of solutions with equity less than 0.6 suggests that it is possible to
avoid highly uneven impacts on ﬁsheries under any budget sce-
nario; given the budgets considered here (≤20% of the total
value of ﬁsheries), any reserve network solution still leaves
substantial area open to each ﬁshery. The nonlinear shape in the
trade-off curves shows that substantial increases in achieving
conservation goals can be achieved with minimal cost to equity,
and vice versa, especially for higher budgets. The result that
higher total budget increases equity emerges from the increased
ﬂexibility to “impact” higher value ﬁsheries (with a small total
budget, total impact is less, but one or a few ﬁsheries experience
the brunt of it). As expected, greater total budget allows for
greater conservation outcomes for a given level of equity (7).
We also found that when conservation goals were prioritized
at a low level relative to equity (i.e., weighted less than ∼10% in
the objective equation in Materials and Methods), solutions all
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Fig. 1. Trade-offs between achieving conservation goals and equity, mea-
sured under the following budget scenarios: (A) monetary impact to the
ﬁshing industry in central California with different budget constraints in
place or (B) loss of ﬁshing grounds in the Misool region of Raja Ampat,
Indonesia. In both cases, the plots represent absolute measures of conser-
vation objectives. The outer edge of the points is drawn to approximate the
efﬁciency frontier; points interior to this frontier resulted from simulations
but are suboptimal.
converged on perfect equity plans without marine reserves (i.e.,
no conservation gain but also no cost to any ﬁshery; result not
shown in Fig. 1). Solutions exist with modest conservation and
high equity outcomes (Fig. S3), but the trade-off with equity
(when equity is weighted highly, >90%) makes these solutions
too costly, because much greater overall value of combined
objectives can be achieved with the no-reserve solution. Using
smaller (i.e., higher resolution) planning units could resolve this
issue by creating more planning options and thus greater ﬂexi-
bility. However, our results here are realistic because our reso-
lution mirrors what was used in the actual planning process and
is practical for most situations.
Southeast Misool Marine Protected Area. There is an ongoing
process to zone a network of multiuse MPAs in Raja Ampat in
eastern Indonesia to support biodiversity conservation and sus-
tainable ﬁsheries (12). We focus here on Southeast Misool MPA
(Fig. S2B). Thirty villages have customary marine tenure and
rights to the MPA, which governs where each village can ﬁsh.
The tenure system in eastern Indonesia is complex, such that
declaring a no-take marine reserve within the larger MPA affects
different individuals, families, clans, or villages. We simulated dif-
ferent no-take reserve network designs and assessed their perfor-
mance in representatively protecting different types of coral reef
habitat (and mitigating stressors to locations) and affecting equity
across villages in lost ﬁshing grounds. We varied a constraint on the
maximum area in no-take reserves as a proxy for different conser-
vation budgets for the creation of marine reserves.
Trade-offs were direct (close to linear) when total (area)
budgets were small (<10% of total area within theMPA placed in
marine reserves; Fig. 1B) and became weaker (concave) with
larger budgets. The concave shape suggests that initial gains in
conservation objectives or equity can be achieved with minimal
cost to the equity objective. When assessed as proportional rather
than absolute differences in how well conservation objectives
were achieved, most trade-off curves were nonlinear (Fig. S4).
Interestingly, the point at which equity overrides conservation
objectives, forcing solutions to the zero-reserve outcome, is when
equity is prioritized only slightly more than conservation (i.e.,
weighted >60–75%), rather than 90% as in the California ex-
ample (Fig. S5). This difference emerges because solutions with
reserves had lower equity scores in Southeast Misool than Cal-
ifornia, due to the fact that about one-half of the coral reef
habitat features in the Misool MPA occurred in fewer than 20%
of the ﬁshing grounds. These sites are critical to achieving overall
conservation objectives, causing greater inequity to villages that
ﬁsh those sites. This uneven distribution of key habitats therefore
requires higher weighting on conservation versus equity objec-
tives to overcome this effect. As with the California example,
higher resolution planning units would likely allow for solutions
with higher equity targets, but such small planning units are
generally not feasible for implementation or enforcement.
Habitats restricted to a few ﬁshing grounds also cause a much
larger range of equity values for conservation solutions on the
frontier in the Indonesia example than is seen in the California
example.
Coral Triangle. The Coral Triangle is composed of six countries
(Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Timor Leste, Solomon Islands,
and Papua New Guinea), divided into 16 ecoregions (Fig. S2C),
whose waters contain the highest global coral biodiversity, but also
some of the most threatened systems (34). The multilateral Coral
Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security
(formalized in May 2009) is the focus of signiﬁcant global con-
servation attention with ﬁnancial commitments of at least US$400
million (www.coraltriangleinitiative.org).
Previous work explored the costs and beneﬁts of investing in
land versus marine conservation to help guide the distribution of
ﬁnancial resources (35). Here, we expand this analysis and ex-
plore two types of equity, the distribution of funds (total and per
capita) to each ecoregion and the costs from restricted access
due to MPA creation per ecoregion. We evaluated how the type
of equity affects conservation outcomes for the Coral Triangle,
measured as the reduction in total ﬁshing impact to reefs across
the Coral Triangle region. As such, this case study allows ex-
ploration of two metrics of equity (access and money) and both
methods of assessment (absolute and proportional). Further-
more, we explore how decisions about whether to initially allo-
cate portions of the total budget (or area set aside in marine
reserves) equitably versus cost effectively inﬂuences outcomes.
The difference reﬂects that budgets can be split between dif-
ferent objectives (e.g., budget allocated each to equity and cost
effectiveness objectives), with the order in which this is done
potentially affecting results. Such decisions are likely common to
almost any planning process.
For the two scenarios that allocate low-to-moderate amounts
of money to ecoregions (US$80 and US$160 million), there is
a nearly direct trade-off between equitable distribution and the
ability to achieve conservation objectives (i.e., mitigate ﬁshing
impacts; Fig. 2A). For very high total budgets, the trade-off curve
becomes concave. This nonlinearity emerges because when more
than ∼60% of funding is allocated equitably, entire ecoregions
receive sufﬁcient funding to fully meet conservation objectives
before the total budget is spent for that region (and it is not
reallocated to other regions). Thus, this nonlinearity is due in
part to the coarse scale of planning units; nonlinearity in the
California example instead emerged from underlying biophysical
properties of the system. Nearly identical results emerge when
measuring equity as per-capita allocation of funds (Fig. 2B). A
notable exception is the unexpected results for equitable-ﬁrst
allocations at 75% and 80%—these two solutions have lower
equity than solutions that allocated less equitably ﬁrst (65% and
70%) because the smallest, least populated ecoregion contains
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Fig. 2. Trade-off between measures of conservation impact (mitigated
ﬁshing pressure) and the equity of distribution of that impact across ecor-
egions in the Coral Triangle region for (A) total budget, (B) regional per-
capita budget, and (C) total area protected. The open symbols represent
allocations that were done ﬁrst cost effectively, and then equitably; the
closed symbols are the reverse. Each point represent 5% additional amount
distributed cost effectively or equitably ﬁrst, respectively. In A and B, total
budget is US$80 million, US$160 million, and US$650 million. In C, total area
set aside is 2,801 million, 5,602 million, or 22,408 million km2, representing
5%, 10%, and 40% of the total region, respectively. The outer edge of the
points is drawn to approximate the efﬁciency frontier; points interior to this
frontier resulted from simulations but are suboptimal.
relatively cost-effective sites and, when resources are allocated at
least 30% cost effectively, the entire region receives protection.
Once that proportion drops to 25%, resources are freed for allo-
cation to other ecoregions, increasing inequity across ecoregions.
These solutions are far inside the efﬁciency frontier and so should
never be selected, i.e., one could achieve the same amount of eq-
uity but much higher conservation outcome with lower amounts of
funds allocated ﬁrst equitably (Fig. 2B).
Surprisingly, there is no trade-off when equity is instead
measured as area within marine reserves (i.e., reduced access)
for low and medium amounts of total area protected, such that
one should always strive for perfect equity in these cases because
one can achieve the same conservation outcome at all levels of
equity (Fig. 2C). This result emerges because when equity in area
across ecoregions is ignored, the most cost-effective sites are
selected for protection, resulting in several ecoregions receiving
almost no protected areas (Table S1). Instead, when emphasis is
placed on achieving equity, a portion of each ecoregion must be
protected. In some cases, these protected places mitigate more
threat than in the more cost-effective scenarios, even though
they are not cost effective, i.e., considerably more expensive to
mitigate equivalent amounts of threat. In this particular example,
the trade-off between cost effectiveness and equity led to nearly
identical conservation outcomes; it seems unlikely that this
would hold in other cases.
Two additional key results emerge from this case study. First,
for low and moderate budgets, there is essentially no difference if
one ﬁrst allocates funds (or area) equitably and then selects
locations that cost effectively meet conservation objectives, or
vice versa. This result does not imply that no trade-off exists
between objectives—higher equity comes at the direct, linear
cost to conservation—but it does mean that for any given level of
equity, one can allocate funds equitably ﬁrst and still achieve the
same conservation outcomes.
Second, for very large budgets, the trade-off becomes non-
linear, as noted above, but in ways that differ for approaches that
allocate resources ﬁrst equitably versus cost effectively. “Cost-
effective–ﬁrst” solutions mitigate less threat than “equitable-ﬁrst”
solutions. This result emerges because equitable-ﬁrst solutions
require area within each ecoregion to be protected, even if those
areas are not the most cost effective over the entire region; they
reduce more threat, but at higher cost. We do not see this result
for lower total budgets because no ecoregion is receiving sufﬁ-
cient funds to protect the whole area under these budgets, so
both equitable-ﬁrst and cost-effective–ﬁrst solutions select sim-
ilar, cost-effective sites for protection. Furthermore, for the
highest total area budget (Fig. 2C), the equitable-ﬁrst approach
produces the typical concave trade-off curve, whereas the cost-
effective–ﬁrst approach produces a split curve, with the initial
half showing the typical concave trade-off, whereas the second
half shows a strong positive relationship. These solutions interior
to the frontier are inferior and should not be chosen, such that
one would always favor the full-equity solution in this latter re-
gion of the curve and the low-equity, high-conservation solutions
in the early region of the curve (Fig. 2C). This split-curve result
emerges because cost-effective–ﬁrst approaches will select the
best sites across the whole region ﬁrst, leading to all sites within
small ecoregions being selected once equity reaches about 0.75;
as equity increases beyond this, more expensive high-value sites
in other regions get selected, causing the conservation outcome
to increase. The relative size of each region and the distribution
of conservation targets within those regions should have a strong
inﬂuence on the presence and shape of this split curve. The split
curve is not seen when allocation is done equitably ﬁrst because
the priority is to have protected areas spread among regions,
making it less likely that entire ecoregions will be protected
under any given budget.
These stark differences in the nature and shape of the trade-
off between equity and conservation objectives when using dif-
ferent metrics (monetary cost versus access to areas) and methods
(absolute versus per capita) highlight the critical importance of
deﬁning which metrics of equity and methods for assessing it
matter most to people engaged in, or affected by, a planning
process. The set of optimal solutions will vary greatly under
these different approaches to incorporating equity, and manage-
ment focus on an inappropriate metric could signiﬁcantly decrease
the probability of success of a proposed solution.
Equity and the Probability of Success
The above analyses and discussion do not address an important
aspect of equity that may allow for combination of the two
currencies into a single measure of triple–bottom-line outcomes.
Highly inequitable solutions are more likely to fail because those
who are disenfranchised from the beneﬁts or outcomes of the
process often feel little motivation to adhere to the agreement
(15). Increases in equity are typically believed to improve the
probability of success by increasing likelihood of self-enforce-
ment of new regulations because people perceive the regulations
as fair (36, 37), yet it is equally likely that management will fail if
the needs or desires of particularly vocal or powerful minorities
are not met. Most of these assumptions remain untested.
Here, we simulate the consequences to conservation prioriti-
zation of considering both social equity and its impact on the
probability that a plan is enacted or upheld. Empirical assess-
ment of these interactions would require a large sample of
conservation actions where equity and conservation effectiveness
are measured, information that currently does not exist and
a ﬁeld of research that merits signiﬁcant attention. For now, we
assume probability of success increases asymptotically with in-
creasing equity, and that extremely inequitable solutions have
near-zero probability of success and that the best case scenario
has very high but not guaranteed chance of success (Materials
and Methods). If instead probability of success peaked at mid-
levels of equity, for example if powerful stakeholders inﬂuence
the outcome, then our results would be even more pronounced.
We assume that expected conservation success is the product
of the probability of success and the biodiversity outcome given
particular levels of equity. Simulations using simple assumptions
about the relationship between social equity and probability of
success show a clear peak in achieving conservation objectives
with modest levels of equity (Fig. 3). This result is striking in that
it highlights how ﬁnal conservation outcomes could be made
much more durable with even modest consideration of equity
effects, by avoiding inequitable outcomes that have little prob-
ability of success, but also better achieve desired outcomes by
avoiding high-equity solutions that excessively compromise con-
servation objectives. In other words, the low probability of suc-
cess when equity is low erases nearly all potential conservation
beneﬁt, whereas the cost to conservation objectives with very
high equity offsets the value added from increased probability
of success (Fig. 3). These results may seem intuitive, but the
framework developed here provides a tool for quantifying these
interactions and helping to optimize decision-making outcomes.
Effort early in the planning process to engage and elicit stake-
holder preferences for different dimensions of equity would
signiﬁcantly improve our understanding of what the probability
of success curve actually looks like. In fact, research has shown
that participatory processes that do not engage those with sig-
niﬁcant stakes in the outcome of the decision (but often little
voice) are less likely to address equity issues (e.g., ref. 21).
Discussion
The spatial patterns of underlying mechanisms that produce
conservation objectives (species distributions, spatial patterns of
threat, and costs to mitigate those threats, etc.) generally require
inequitable distribution of resources to achieve optimal conser-
vation outcomes. However, few planning processes focus solely
on achieving conservation objectives, given stakeholder interest
in minimizing negative impact to speciﬁc groups or maximizing
economic gain. This tension among values sits at the heart of
perceived and real trade-offs among conservation objectives,
total economic gains (or losses), and social equity. To date, the
issue of equity has largely been addressed indirectly, through
implicit assumptions about spreading costs or beneﬁts, or as
a secondary concern, as with post hoc comparisons of the equity
of outcomes (36). We have shown here that explicit assessment
of how equity inﬂuences the ability to achieve conservation
outcomes produces a more nuanced and realistic picture of the
effects of any given conservation objective on different groups,
and may indicate under what conditions signiﬁcant trade-offs are
likely to occur. Hopefully, applying this framework will lead to
solutions unrecognized without direct consideration of equity.
The solutions that lie along the “frontier” in the case studies
are triple–bottom-line solutions, where one can optimize con-
servation goals and equity while minimizing costs. Solutions in-
terior to these frontier solutions (most of which are not plotted)
are all possible and represent the many ways decision making can
miss the mark on the triple bottom line. As in other trade-off
assessments (5, 6, 30), ﬁnding the frontier does not then prescribe
a single correct solution but instead presents the range of options,
all optimal, that represent the trade-off between stated goals. As
the case studies show, there is almost always a trade-off between
biodiversity conservation and equity, but the extent of this trade-
off varies depending on the context and the exact formulation of
the objective function. Ignoring issues of equity in conservation
planning will likely produce suboptimal outcomes and risks failure
in prioritization efforts and durability of implemented actions.
We have focused here on a few types of equity, namely the dis-
tribution of costs and access to resources. Although these two types
are likely the most common to conservation planning exercises,
many other types clearly exist, most notably gender (16, 17), in-
tergenerational (22, 23), and geographic equity [such as with global
trade and its displacement of environmental impacts, and the cor-
ollary, climate change impacts (38)]. These different kinds of social
and economic equity likely constrain conservation prioritization
and planning in different ways, yet to be explored formally.
Two key assumptions affect our results and suggest impor-
tant areas for further research. First, we measured biodiversity
objectives by tracking how much threat was abated in a given
location. This is a proxy at best for true changes in conservation
values and outcomes, and so the actual shape of the trade-off
between equity and conservation objectives may differ from
what we found here. Perhaps more importantly, threat abate-
ment can be achieved more quickly than ultimate conservation
goals, such as number of species recovered to stable population
sizes. Because the consequences of social equity play out relatively
quickly whereas conservation goals tend to take time to achieve,
full treatment of equity issues in conservation planning need to
address the temporal as well as spatial components. Second, the
shape of equity-probability curves characterizing how equity
affects the likelihood of success of a plan remains largely un-
known. Empirical research focused on determining the shape of
this curve would provide the key to combining the two currencies
into a single metric, allowing for more accurate identiﬁcation of
triple–bottom-line solutions.
Conservation planning, whether in the ocean or on land, strives
to ﬁnd optimal solutions in the face of inherent constraints. Tri-
ple–bottom-line outcomes remain highly prized, but they cannot
be achieved regularly without formal approaches to considering
equity alongside the more traditional focus on minimizing costs
and maximizing conservation objectives. Incorporating equity
can produce nonintuitive results, as with the California and
Raja Ampat case studies where strong emphasis on equity leads
to zero-MPA solutions. More importantly, it produces realistic
results, and that realism will go a long way toward building stake-
holder acceptance of management plans and outcomes.
We have focused here on marine conservation planning
problems, but the approach and implications of the results are
relevant to a broader spatial planning context, where planning
objectives can include ecosystem services other than biodiversity
conservation. Social and economic equity is almost always on the
minds of stakeholders involved in these processes; the frame-
work and theory we have developed here provides a means to
make such concerns explicit and quantitative.
Materials and Methods
In each case study, we implemented marine reserves (i.e., no-take areas) and
assumed that their implementation eliminates ﬁshing from the reserve
region and that the ﬁshing is not redistributed. The conservation beneﬁt of
reserves varied across case studies, described below and in SI Text. Although
the type of equity measured in each case study was different, we use the
same metric to evaluate equity, the widely recognized and used Gini co-
efﬁcient (39). In our context here, the Gini coefﬁcient measures the dis-
similarity in costs or proﬁts among different entities. It indicates the
difference between a perfectly equitable distribution and the actual distri-
bution of a resource. Although the Gini coefﬁcient is commonly used as
a measure of inequality of wealth (40), it has also been applied to describe
other types of inequalities (41–44). We adapt the Gini coefﬁcient to measure
equality rather than inequality by using its inverse (1 − Gini, henceforth
referred to as “equity”), where a value of 1 represents perfect equality and
a value of zero represents maximal inequality (Eq. S1). Details for data used
in each case study are provided in SI Text.
California and Raja Ampat Case Studies. For the California and Raja Ampat
case studies, we examined the trade-off between conservation and equity
goals constrained by a ﬁxed budget. The budget was deﬁned as the total
monetary cost to ﬁsheries and the total area lost within ﬁshing grounds,
respectively. For California, we present trade-off curves with the budget
ranging from 3% to 20% of the combined value of ﬁsheries. Optimal solutions
on the trade-off frontier were searched for using the objective function Obj =
max [αE1μ + (1 − α)E2], subject to the budget constraint Σ(Ck) ≤ B, where α
is the conservation weighting, E1 is the equity in habitat representation in
reserves, E2 is the equity in ﬁshery impacts of reserves, and μ is the minimum
representation of a habitat in reserves (Eq. S1; see Table S2 for parameters
used to calculate E). Thus, a reserve plan with either low representation equity
or low representation of a single habitat would have a low conservation score.
Ck is the costs to each ﬁshery of the reserves and B is the total budget (e.g., see
ref. 45). Varying the conservation weighting 0–1 gives the optimal solution for
different points on the trade-off frontier. The set of possible reserves is too
large to explore exhaustively (23610 possibilities in CA and 2670 in RA), so we
used simulated annealing to ﬁnd near-optimal solutions (46, 47). For all
annealing simulations, we compared the objective function value for the
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Fig. 3. The relationship between equity and biodiversity, and how proba-
bility of success given different levels of equity modiﬁes the ability to ach-
ieve biodiversity conservation targets. the solid black line shows the trade-
off between conservation objectives and equity. The dashed gray lines show
two hypothetical shapes for the relationship between equity and probability
of success, and the solid gray lines are the resulting consequences of these
probability curves on the degree to which conservation objectives are met.
near-optimal solution to its value with no marine reserves, setting μ = 0 and
E2 = 1. Although true optimal solutions cannot be found without an ex-
haustive search, the performance of the optimization algorithm was checked
by comparing its results to outcomes from 1 million randomly sampled ma-
rine reserve plans for each case study. The frontier found using simulated
annealing was considerably better than random.
Coral Triangle Case Study. We used the Coral Triangle boundaries and
ecoregions (n = 16) deﬁned by Veron et al. (48) on the basis of coral diversity
and endemism. We used the global coral reef atlas (49) to determine the
presence/absence of coral reefs for each 1-km2 cell in each ecoregion. The
objective of this case study was to minimize ﬁshing impacts on coral reefs
through investment in marine reserves, given a ﬁxed budget that could be
used to compensate for changes in economic opportunity arising from given
actions, such as for lost ﬁshing opportunity. To determine the priority of
an area for designation as a marine protected area, we calculated return on
investment of protecting each 1-km2 reef unit, where return was measured
as reduction of ﬁshing and investment as cost of reducing each threat.
Using this information, we allocated resources using two different methods:
(i) “cost-effective” allocation, where resources are allocated to coral reefs
with the highest return on investment; (ii ) “equitable” allocation, where
resources are divided equitably between each of the 16 ecoregions, and
then allocated cost effectively within each ecoregion and visa versa. We
analyzed the trade-off between conservation (i.e., reduction of ﬁshing
pressure) and equity (i.e., distribution of resources to ecoregions) for sce-
narios that range from spending 100% of the budget cost effectively for
conservation to 100% equitably for the community. We implemented dif-
ferent types of budget constraints: (i) ﬁnancial budget of $80 million, $160
million, and $650 million; (ii) ﬁnancial budget per capita, such that, when
allocated equitably, is split equally among people; and (iii) area budget of
protecting 2,801, 5,602, and 22,408 km2 of coral reef (5%, 10%, and 40% of
the total region, respectively). Financial budget constraints were based on
a value that, when distributed equitably, was insufﬁcient to protect any
ecoregion entirely (US$160 million), and one-half and four times that
amount (for illustrative purposes). Area budget constraints were based on
a 10% target (5,602 km2), a common target for protection, and equivalent
one-half and four times changes as with the monetary budget.
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